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RISK OF JURY CONFUSION AS THE
GROUND FOR DISCRETIONARY
DISMISSALS OF
SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS
JOHN D. EGNAL*
INTRODUCTION
A damages claim based on federal law will often involve facts
which give rise to related state law claims. Since the major expan
sion of the scope of a civil action occasioned by the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,1 claimants have joined
their related federal and non-federal2 claims in a single lawsuit.
Often such joinder results in a question of subject matter jurisdic
tion over the non-federal claims. In 1966, the Warren Court articu
lated a simple, welcoming approach to such jurisdiction in the
landmark case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.3 In stark contrast,
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts exhibited such hostility to these
claims that in 1990, Congress settled the basic dispute by codifying
the Gibbs approach.4 In 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), using the term sup
plemental jurisdiction, Congress provided for subject matter juris
diction over all claims that are “part of the same case or
controversy.”5
Throughout this period from 1966 to 1990, a number of issues
roiled in the wake of the Gibbs doctrine,6 which addressed the sub
* B.A., Lehigh University; J.D., Temple University; LL.M., Temple University. I
would like to thank my colleagues Bruce Miller and Art Wolf for their invaluable
assistance.
1. FED. R. CIV. P.; Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of
1938 and its Discontents, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 283 (2008).
2. Non-federal, as used in this article, refers to a claim which, standing alone, does
not satisfy any ground of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Normally, such claims
would be based on state law between citizens who are not diverse under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a), or who are diverse as to claims for less than the jurisdictional amount.
3. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (finding that
“state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Proce
dural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL.
85
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ject matter jurisdictional power of the federal trial courts over nonfederal, or as they were then known, pendent claims. One such
problem was whether the trial judge should entertain the claim—a
question of the court’s discretion. Judge-made law addressed this
question, identifying various grounds that would justify dismissal
(even if the court had the power to entertain the claim).7 For exam
ple, dismissal of the state law claim was appropriate when the fed
eral claim—the basis for federal jurisdiction—had been dismissed
or was simply the tail on a state law dog, or when considerations of
comity called for unsettled state law issues to be resolved by the
state courts.8 The 1990 statute in § 1367(c) expressly codified these
three grounds for discretionary dismissal.9
One judge-made ground for discretionary dismissal was not ex
pressly codified—dismissal of a state law claim based solely on the
ground that trial of both the state and federal claims in one lawsuit
might lead to jury confusion.10 This article will address the un
resolved question of the appropriateness of the use of this ground
to dismiss a state law claim properly joined to a related federal
claim.
I. GROUNDS

FOR

DISMISSAL

OF

SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS

Since Congress created the lower federal courts in 1789,11 there
has been a problem defining the scope of the federal judicial power
in lawsuits involving the joinder of both federal and non-federal
claims. While it is axiomatic that only Congress can define the
scope of that power (within the bounds established by Article III of
the Constitution), prior to 1990, Congress had, with few exceptions,
left this problem to the federal courts.12
L. REV. 1399 (1983); Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and
Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE L. J. 627 (1978); Michael Shakman, The New Pendent
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968) (all providing varying
interpretations of the Gibbs standard).
7. See Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1967).
8. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 official commentary at 765-66 (West 2006); Patel v.
Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 1996) (state law claim predominated); Fable v.
Braslow, 913 F.Supp. 145, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d 111 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (fed
eral claims dismissed); Saturday Evening Post. Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d
1191, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.Supp. 1215, 1221
(S.D.N.Y 1978); see also infra note 19.
9. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (text of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006)).
10. See id.
11. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
12. The most pertinent to this article is 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (2006), which pro
vides for subject matter jurisdiction over “a claim of unfair competition when joined
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Using the labels “pendent” and “ancillary,” the federal courts
developed two overlapping judge-made doctrines to address the
problem. The 1966 Supreme Court decision of United Mine Work
ers v. Gibbs became the leading case.13 Gibbs reflected a welcom
ing approach to the problem of jurisdictional power.14
In Gibbs, a federal claim (labor law) was joined with a state
law claim (interference with contract).15 The Court first held that
the district court had power (i.e. pendent subject matter jurisdic
tion) over the state law (non-federal) claim because the two claims,
with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection
or trademark laws.” The House Report stated:
Subsection (b) is added and is intended to avoid “piecemeal” litigation to en
force common-law and statutory copyright, patent, and trade-mark rights by
specifically permitting such enforcement in a single civil action in the district
court. While this is the rule under Federal decisions, this section would enact
it as statutory authority. The problem is discussed at length in Hurn v. Oursler
(1933, 53 S. Ct. 586, 289 U.S. 238, 77 L.Ed. 1148) and in Musher Foundation v.
Alba Trading Co. (C.C.A. 1942, 127 F.2d 9) (majority and dissenting
opinions).
Historical and Revision Notes, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006).
In 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006), Congress provided that:
[N]otwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have orig
inal but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11
[Bankruptcy Code] or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). And in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2006), Congress provided that fed
eral courts may “abstain[ ] from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11.” Such language has been interpreted to
recognize the power of federal courts to hear supplemental claims. See Patrick M. Bir
ney & Michael R. Enright, May a Bankruptcy Court Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
Predicated on its Referred “Related To” Jurisdiction?, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 1, 3 (2010).
In 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006), Congress authorized the removal of “a separate and
independent claim” when joined with a removable federal question claim. In the early
days, fewer lawsuits raised the problem; the 1938 Federal Rules and post-WWII federal
legislation increased dramatically the lawsuits containing the joinder of federal and
non-federal claims.
13. The portion of Gibbs relevant to this discussion is Part I. Gibbs was written
by Justice Brennan, Part I (which addressed the subject matter jurisdiction issue) was
joined by all of the Justices who participated; Chief Justice Warren did not participate.
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 715 (1966). See D.C. Common
Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that Gibbs is the
leading case); Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1211 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that Gibbs
is the leading case).
14. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724-25 (overturning the “unnecessarily grudging” approach
of Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933)). For a detailed description of the early
developments leading up to Gibbs, see Arthur D. Wolf, Codification of Supplemental
Jurisdiction: Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1992).
15. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 717-18. Since there was no diversity of citizenship, this was
a non-federal claim.
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together, “comprise[d] but one constitutional ‘case.’”16 In later
cases, the Supreme Court differentiated between Gibbs (involving
a pendent claim), and cases where the state law claim was asserted
against one not subject to the federal claim (pendent party).17 The
1990 statute eliminated this distinction, making it clear in the final
sentence of § 1367(a) that newly named supplemental jurisdiction
was available in such a situation.18
But another problem remained. The Gibbs opinion, in dicta,
elaborated on the “consistently . . . recognized” notion that the trial
court had the discretion to dismiss the state law, or pendent
claims,19 and held that the trial court had not abused that discretion
by retaining jurisdiction after the federal claim had been dismissed
on the merits.20 As with its holding regarding jurisdictional power,
Gibbs’s discussion of discretion reflected a welcoming approach to
federal jurisdiction.
Gibbs mentioned grounds that would be appropriate to justify
a discretionary dismissal.21 One was “the likelihood of jury confu
sion” if both the federal and state claims were tried to a single
jury.22 Other possible grounds that might justify a discretionary dis
missal were also mentioned, but Justice Brennan stressed the idea
that pendent jurisdiction’s “justification lies in the considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.”23 The
presence of these factors supported retention of the pendent claim,
while their absence should incline a trial judge to dismiss.
16. Id. at 725.
17. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
18. The text of § 1367(a) is:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided other
wise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) (2006) (emphasis added).
19. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Gibbs cited Mass. Universalist Convention v. Hil
dreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 1949) (upholding the dismissal, without
prejudice, of a pendent state law claim in the wake of a dismissal, on the merits, of the
federal question claim).
20. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 728.
21. Id. at 726-27.
22. Id. at 727, 723, 725 n.13 (reflecting the welcoming approach to pendent juris
diction, the Court offered ideas on retaining the entire case, such as the use of a special
verdict, and stressed the importance of “‘try[ing] his . . . whole case at one time’”)
(quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 320 (1927)).
23. Id. at 726.
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The Court returned to the issue of discretion to dismiss a pen
dent claim in 1970 in Rosado v. Wyman,24 where, like Gibbs, it up
held a trial judge’s decision to retain jurisdiction over a pendent
claim.25 In Rosado, where the federal claim became moot, the
Court reiterated the theme that retention of pendent claims should
be the norm:
We are not willing to defeat the commonsense policy of pendent
jurisdiction—the conservation of judicial energy and the avoid
ance of multiplicity of litigation—by a conceptual approach that
would require jurisdiction over the primary claim at all stages as
a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim.26

Rosado reiterated the broad, welcoming theme of Gibbs.27
The next opinion, three years later, reflected the shift brought on by
the Burger Court’s28 much less welcoming approach to federal
plaintiffs in general and to civil rights plaintiffs in particular.29 The
case, Moor v. County of Alameda,30 involved a pendent party
24. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
25. Id. at 401.
26. Id. at 405.
27. Id. at 404-08. Rosado was decided during the transition from the Warren
Court (which ended in 1969 with the appointment of Chief Justice Burger) to the con
servative Burger court, which was completed in 1971 with the appointments of Justices
Powell and Rehnquist. JOHN DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 265 (2002) (“The
Rehnquist choice, however, has redefined the Supreme Court, making it a politically
conservative bastion within our governmental system.”). While technically the Burger
Court, Rosado was a 7-2 decision, written by Justice Harlan. Rosado, 397 U.S. at 399.
The dissent, written by Justice Black, was joined by Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 430-35.
28. See generally DEAN, supra note 27 (describing the shift resulting from Presi
dent Nixon’s four appointments between 1969 and 1971).
29. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1962). With the language
that follows, the Court redefined the qualified immunity defense to permit civil rights
defendants to successfully move for summary judgment:
Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we conclude
today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government
officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discov
ery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Id. at 817-18; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights
Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 537 (2003) (“Legal Services Corporation v. Velaz
quez . . . is aberrational because a civil rights plaintiff won, which has rarely happened
in recent years in the Rehnquist Court. A year ago, in October Term 2000, the Court
ruled against civil rights claims in virtually every case in which they were presented.”).
30. Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 713-18 (1973).
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claim31 that was dismissed on two grounds. The trial judge in Moor
dismissed pendent state law claims against the county, even though
the related federal claims against individual defendants (county em
ployees) were still pending.32 The trial judge pointed to: (1) the
novel and complex state law issues raised by the pendent claims and
(2) likelihood of jury confusion if the state and federal claims were
tried to the same jury.33 Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court upheld this dismissal.34 Whether Moor’s language as to jury
confusion was holding or dicta, federal trial judges had little doubt
after Moor that they could dismiss a pendent state law claim on the
ground there was a likelihood of jury confusion.35
Three grounds other than jury confusion were mentioned in
Gibbs as justification for discretionary dismissal: (1) the non-fed
eral claim raises novel or complex issues of state law;36 (2) the nonfederal claim substantially predominates the lawsuit;37 and (3) the
federal claim has been dismissed before trial.38 These three
grounds for discretionary dismissal were adopted by Congress as
§ 1367(c)(1), (c)(2) and (c)(3).39 In each of these situations, it is
easy to see the justice in sending those claims to the state courts for
31. Unlike Gibbs, where the pendent claim was added against the union, a party
already subject to federal jurisdiction, the pendent party claim in Moor was asserted
against the county, which was not subject to federal jurisdiction. Compare United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), with Moor, 411 U.S. at 710-17 (Part
II).
32. Moor, 411 U.S. at 697.
33. Id.at 715-16.
34. Id. at 697, 717.
35. See Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of the Federal
Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 125-26 (2006) (describing “the virtually
unfettered discretion” available to trial judges).
36. Gibbs, 383 US at 726 (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided
both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for
them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”).
37. Id. at 726-27 (“Similarly, if it appears that the state issues substantially
predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without
prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals.”).
38. Id. at 726 (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even
though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as
well.”).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (“The district courts may decline to exercise sup
plemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if–(1) the claim raises a novel
or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”). In addition, Congress
provided in (c)(4) authority to dismiss a supplemental claim “in exceptional circum
stances, [when] there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id.
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resolution. This is easiest to see for the second and third grounds.
In cases involving the third ground, state law claims are the only
ones left in the lawsuit; in the case of the second ground, the lawsuit
is predominantly based on state law. Thus, for these two grounds,
there is no problem of a lawsuit divided between state and federal
court. For the first ground (novel or complex state law) a discre
tionary dismissal of the state law claims does create the burdens of
a divided lawsuit, a risk which Gibbs suggested should be balanced
against the need for the “surer-footed” reading of state law.40
Unlike the three grounds discussed in the previous paragraph,
risk of jury confusion does not serve any obvious federal or national
interest. Yet it can be easily invoked by a judge who wants to disfa
vor the civil rights plaintiff or favor the defense.41 Despite the tech
niques available to minimize the risk of confusion42 and the small
likelihood that a civil lawsuit will actually be tried,43 there was no
doubt that the pre-1990 case law permitted a trial judge to dismiss a
pendent claim simply by stating there was a risk of jury confusion if
the case were tried to a single jury.44 Many judges had made it a
40. An alternative to dismissal of a claim involving unsettled state law is certifica
tion of question(s) of law by the federal court to the highest court of the state. See
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997) (“Certification proce
dure, in contrast, allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the
question directly to the State’s highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and
increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.”); 17A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE
DURE § 4248 (3d ed. 2011); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a
Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (2003). The Wolf-Egnal proposal
contained such a provision. Subsection (f) provided “[t]he district court, in determining
the nature and scope of any non-federal claim based on state law, shall freely utilize any
certification procedures available for the determination of state law.” Federal Courts
Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearings on H.R.
5381 and H.R. 3898 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary 31, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]. See infra notes 102-109 (discussing the Wolf-Egnal
proposal).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
42. In Gibbs, Justice Brennan praised the trial judge for using a special verdict
form to aid the jury’s resolution of multiple claims. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729; see also
Matthew A. Reiber, The Complexity of Complexity: an Empirical Study of Juror Com
petence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929 (2010) (discussing methods for improving
the ability of juries to deal with complex cases); Development in the Law, The Jury’s
Capacity to Decide Complex Civil Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1997) (same).
43. See Government Survey Shows 97 Percent Of Civil Cases Settled, PHOENIX
BUSINESS JOURNAL (May 30, 2004), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2004/
05/31/newscolumn5.html; see also infra note 275.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
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routine practice to dismiss such claims45 and as long as they stated a
reason, they were rarely found to have abused their discretion.46
As noted above, the new statute contained, in subsection (c), a
provision authorizing the use of discretionary dismissal. If the sup
plemental claims were dismissed and the federal claims were still
pending in federal court, the plaintiff would be faced with four
choices—none good: (1) the costly and difficult option of appellate
review.47 If appellate review failed or was not attempted, the re
maining choices are (2) file a state court lawsuit raising the state law
claims and pursue lawsuits in both state and federal court,48 (3) file
a state court lawsuit raising the state law claims and abandon the
federal claims,49 or (4) stay in federal court and abandon the state
law claims.
Such was the law in 1990, when in the wake of confusion sowed
in 1989 by the 5-4 decision of Finley v. United States,50 Congress
responded promptly51 and adopted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, using the term
45. See infra notes 68-76.
46. If the trial judge gave risk of jury confusion as the reason, reversal was un
likely; cf. Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1073 (2d Cir. 1989) (giving no reason for
refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion).
47. The appeal could fail on the merits (trial judge did not abuse her discretion)
or the appeal could be dismissed as not a final order. See David D. Siegel, Practice
Commentary, Operation of “Supplemental” Jurisdiction Under § 1367, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1367 (West 1993) (“Appealability of Discretionary Dismissal[:] It would have been
helpful if Congress had included some instruction about whether a dismissal under
§ 1367(c) is appealable. Congress having said nothing about it, however, the matter
must be left to the usual batch of appellate statutes and rules, notably 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1291 and 1292 and Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
§ 1291, the rule is that the disposition must be ‘final’ in order to be appealable. If all
claims are dismissed, giving rise to a final disposition of the whole case, finality would
be satisfied and appeal allowed. When only the dependent claim is dismissed, however,
the matter is more complex. Prior cases involving dismissals of claims that depended on
pendent or ancillary jurisdiction can be consulted.”).
48. In addition to the obvious duplication in pretrial proceedings and the greater
difficulty in achieving settlement when cases are pending in both state and federal
court, preclusion problems are likely to arise as soon as one of the two lawsuits becomes
final. See Edward H. Cooper, An Alternative and Discretionary § 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 153,
158-59 (1998); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §4412 (2011).
49. If the federal claims are joined in the state court lawsuit, the defendant can
remove the entire case to federal court.
50. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); see also discussion infra notes 88
94.
51. Justice Scalia seemed to solicit a Congressional response with the following:
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular
statute can of course be changed by Congress. What is of paramount impor
tance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear inter
pretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.
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supplemental 52 to replace both pendent and ancillary. The key pro
visions of the statute were sections (a), (b) and (c).
Section 1367(a) essentially codified the “power” paragraph of
Gibbs, using “the same case or controversy under Article III . . . .”53
Congress added a sentence at the end of § 1367(a) to make it pellu
cidly clear that the “one case” test applied both where there was
one plaintiff and one defendant, like Gibbs, as well as “claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”54 Section
(b) imposed limitations on the use of supplemental jurisdiction in
certain cases where there were no federal question claims and fed
eral jurisdiction was available “solely on” the basis of diversity of
citizenship.55 Subsections (c)(1)-(3) set forth three specific grounds,
all based on language from Gibbs, on which a trial judge could base
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
52. The term “supplemental” seems to have been coined by Professor Richard A.
Matasar in Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and the Rejec
tion of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (1983).
In footnote 3, Matasar states that:
[f]or convenience, this Article uses “supplemental jurisdiction” throughout to
refer to all exercises of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The term is apt, for
it suggests an extension of power over claims normally outside federal jurisdic
tion in order to serve important federal interests that supplement the purposes
underlying the decision on the original federal claims. See, e.g., United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (allowing convenient and efficient liti
gation of an entire legal dispute); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450
(1861) (ensuring a forum for vindication of claims); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (preserving a federal court’s abil
ity to function effectively).
Id. at 1402 n.3; see also William D. Claster, Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdic
tion: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1271-87 (1975);
Richard D. Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987
DUKE L.J. 34, 34 (stating that “‘[s]upplemental jurisdiction’ is a generic term encom
passing the concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction”).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006); see supra note 18. With respect to this subsection,
both the text and the House Report are consistent.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Thus Congress clearly overturned both Aldinger and
Finley.
55. Id. § 1367(b). Subsection (b) contained obvious drafting flaws which led to a
serious split in the circuits over its application to class actions and to simple joinder by
the plaintiff of another plaintiff who did not meet the amount in controversy require
ment or was not diverse from the defendant. In 2005, the Supreme Court, in Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005), ended the dispute, hold
ing that § 1367(b) did not preclude supplemental plaintiffs who did not satisfy the
amount requirement, but did preclude supplemental plaintiffs who did not satisfy the
diversity requirement. For the extensive literature (from 1990 to 2004) on this issue, see
Richard D. Freer, The Cauldron Boils: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Amount in Contro
versy, and Diversity of Citizenship Class Actions, 53 EMORY L.J. 55, 57 n.15 (2004) (“I
will not even try to list a representative sample [of the law review articles concerning
§ 1367(b)] except to note a colloquium in the Emory Law Journal in 1992, 41 EMORY
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a discretionary dismissal, as well as a “catch all” provision in
(c)(4).56 The full text of § 1367(c) is as follows:
[Authority of Courts to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction:] The
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if-(1) the claim raises a novel or
complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predomi
nates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional cir
cumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.57

It is clear that the likelihood of jury confusion is not part of
§ 1367(c)(1)-(3). The topic that this article will address is whether
this ground for discretionary dismissal has survived and is part of
§ 1367(c)(4), or whether it has been eliminated by the 1990 statute.
In Part II of this Article, the pre-1990 history relevant to the
topic will be expanded beyond the brief discussion in this introduc
tion. Part III will examine the legislative history of § 1367(c)(4),
followed in Part IV by the reaction of the district courts (IV.A),
courts of appeal (IV.B), and scholars (IV.C). Part V will reflect the
author’s own analysis of the availability of the risk of jury confusion
as the basis for a § 1367(c)(4) dismissal.
II. PRE-1990 HISTORY: JURY CONFUSION
JUDGE-MADE LIST

IS ON THE

As one might expect, the reported decisions after Gibbs and
before the adoption of § 1367 (1966 to 1990) involving a proposed
discretionary dismissal of a pendent58 claim based solely on the
ground of a likelihood of jury confusion reflect a mixed picture—
some were dismissed and some were retained.59 Judges who re
tained jurisdiction tended to focus on the reasoning from the 1966
and 1970 decisions of the Supreme Court (Gibbs and Rosado),
L.J. 1, and a symposium in 1998, published at 74 IND. L.J. 1, which featured four articles
and nine responses.”).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006).
57. Id.
58. In this Part II, the term “pendent” will be used; “supplemental” was not used
in this context by the courts until the adoption of § 1367 in 1990.
59. See Carrol v. General Datacomm Industries, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 71, 73
(D.Conn. 1987) (retaining pendent claim); Esposito v. Buonome, 647 F.Supp. 580, 581
(D.Conn. 1986) (dismissing pendent claim); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc.,
555 F.Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1983) (dismissing pendent claim).
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which upheld jurisdiction over pendent claims, even after the fed
eral claims had dropped from the cases.60 Thus these decisions fo
cused on overall efficiency and fairness to litigants.
For example, in Miller v. Lovett,61 the Second Circuit reversed
a pretrial dismissal of a pendent claim. The federal § 1983 claim for
excessive force was tried to a jury and resulted in a defendants’ ver
dict.62 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the verdict on the
federal claim due to errors in the instructions and remanded for a
new trial. It then addressed the pretrial dismissal of the pendent
claim.
Miller asserted a constitutional claim of excessive force and com
mon-law claims for negligence and assault and battery. If these
federal and state claims are so tightly interwoven that a decision
on the former will collaterally estop litigation of latter, we see no
principled reason for refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over the entire case, and potential injustice in failing to do so.
The reasons given by the district court for dismissing the
state claims are unpersuasive. In its one-page endorsement rul
ing, the court stated that “courts in this district have repeatedly
discouraged pendent claims in section 1983 litigation”, and that
Miller “d[id] not adequately address the concerns raised in Espo
sito [v. Buonome, 647 F.Supp. 580 (D.Conn.1986)].” It is obvi
ous, first, that dismissing Miller’s pendent claims on the ground
that they are “discouraged” in § 1983 cases is tantamount to giv
ing no reason at all for their dismissal. No decision of the Su
preme Court or of this circuit implies that pendent jurisdiction is
disfavored in civil rights actions; indeed our viewpoint is to the
contrary. See Perez [v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793,] 798 [2d Cir. 1988].
Even if it ever had validity, Esposito, on which the district
court relied, is now outdated. . . . Any remaining danger of jury
confusion under the new standard can in most cases readily be
met with judicious use of special verdicts and carefully drawn in
structions. See Carroll v. General Datacomm Industries, Inc., 680
F.Supp. 71, 73 (D.Conn.1987) (Burns, J.).63
60. See, e.g., Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. Id. at 1073.
62. Id. at 1068-69. Apparently, plaintiff chose to abandon the state law claim; no
further proceedings are reported. Id.
63. Id. at 1073. Miller specifically explained why Esposito was outdated.
[In Esposito], common-law tort claims were dropped from a § 1983 action pri
marily because the common-law standard for liability (reasonableness) con
flicted with what was assumed to be the federal standard (the “shock the
conscience” test of Johnson v. Glick ) [sic] and therefore were thought to cre
ate a likelihood of jury confusion. 647 F.Supp. at 581. As we discuss more
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There are few reported opinions by trial judges denying an un
appealable64 motion to dismiss a pendent claim. One example is
West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, where the town sued under al
leging causes of action against activists who protested at a women’s
clinic including: violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO), violations of Connecticut statutory law,
common law nuisance, conspiracy, and negligence.65 In granting a
preliminary injunction the court held that injunctive relief was not
available under civil provisions of RICO, but that for purposes of
obtaining a preliminary injunction under state nuisance law, the
town established the likelihood of success on the merits.66 As to
the court’s jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims, the court
cited Miller v. Lovett for the proposition that “a presumption favors
exercising [pendent] jurisdiction.”67
Far more common during this period are reported decisions
dismissing pendent claims on the ground of jury confusion. Some,
for example the lower court in Miller v. Lovett,68 explain why there
would be a likelihood of jury confusion if the federal and pendent
claims were tried together. Many, however, simply invoke a broad
(not case specific) presumption against the assertion of pendent
jurisdiction.69
A classic example is Douglas v. Town of Hartford,70 where a
mother and her son filed excessive force § 1983 claims against Hart
ford and several of its police officers. The son was in utero when his
mother was assaulted.71 Chief Judge Clarie refused to dismiss the
son’s federal claims against the police officers72 but did dismiss the
extensively above, however, the “shock the conscience” standard no longer
applies to cases such as this, and the proper test is now one of “reasonable
ness” under the [F]ourth [A]mendment. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1865.
Id.
64. Such decisions are not “final” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus not appeala
ble. See supra note 47.
65. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 371, 371 (D.Conn.
1989).
66. Id. at 378, 381.
67. Id. at 376.
68. Miller, 879 F.2d at 1073. The lower court opinion is not reported; it is quoted
in part by the Second Circuit.
69. Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F.Supp. 1267, 1269 (D.Conn. 1982).
70. Id. at 1269.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court did hold that the plaintiff could not sue “John Doe” defendants;
rather, plaintiff had to identify and serve each defendant it wanted to sue. Id.
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Monell (federal) claims against Hartford.73 Judge Clarie then
turned to the defendants’ motion to dismiss the pendent (state law)
claims against both the police officers and the municipality. What
follows is his entire discussion of the defendants’ motion to dismiss
these pendent claims:
In the Third Count of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege a myr
iad of state law claims sounding in tort, including assault and bat
tery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and
gross negligence. This Court has regularly stated that it will not
exercise pendent jurisdiction over state tort claims in civil rights
actions commenced under § 1983, because these federal lawsuits
would be unnecessarily complicated and burdened by the intro
duction of many state law issues into an already complex litigation.
See Galbert v. City of Hartford, Civ. No. H-80-576, Ruling on
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (May 28, 1982); Saylor v. Town
of Hartford, Civ. No. 8-81-542, Ruling on Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (December 31, 1981). Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Count III of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleges violations of
the state tort law.74

Writ large, there is no doubt that prior to 1990 the likelihood
of jury confusion was a proper ground on which to base the pretrial
dismissal of a pendent claim. As we have seen, the lower courts
differed as to the need for a case-specific analysis. They also dif
fered as to the slope of the playing field: was it level, or was there a
presumption in favor or against the assertion of pendent jurisdic
tion? While the United States Supreme Court never addressed
these questions, it is clear that the favorable view of pendent juris
diction exhibited by the Warren Court75 was replaced with a nega
tive—one might say very “grudging”—view by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts.76
Despite the different approaches to discretionary dismissals of
pendent claims, from the Gibbs-Rosado-Miller approach that fa
73. Id. at 1271. The claims were dismissed based on the soon-to-be-discredited
heightened pleading standard; see Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence
and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that a court may not require a
heightened pleading standard in a § 1983 municipal liability case).
74. Id. at 1271 (emphasis added); see also Esposito v. Buonome, 647 F.Supp. 580,
580-81 (D.Conn. 1986) (disapproved by the Second Circuit in Miller v. Lovett, supra
notes 62-64); Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347, 349 (D. Haw. 1973).
75. The Warren Court presided over the cases from Gibbs (1966) to Rosado
(1970) (see supra text accompanying notes 13-28).
76. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts presided over the cases from Moor (1973)
to Finley (1989) (see supra text accompanying notes 28-35); for reference to grudging,
see supra note 14.
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vored retention, to the Moor-Douglas approach that favored dis
missal, the impetus for legislative action had nothing to do with
discretionary dismissals. Rather, as mentioned in the Introduction,
it was the 1989 5-4 decision of Finley v. United States, concerning
jurisdiction power, that led directly to the adoption in 1990 of
§ 1367.77
III.

THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE PATH OF § 1367(C)(4): JURY
CONFUSION IS NOT ON THE LIST

This section will focus on the text and legislative path of
§ 1367(c)(4). The best place to begin the story of the adoption of
§ 1367 is with one of the vexing questions left open after Gibbs:
whether its rationale would apply to claims against so-called pen
dent parties.78 Outside the Ninth Circuit,79 most courts of appeals
resolved that question in the affirmative.80 The Supreme Court
never fully addressed it. In Moor v. County of Alameda,81 the
Court explicitly left the question open, resting its decision on what
it viewed as appropriate use below of a discretionary dismissal. In
Aldinger v. Howard,82 the Court again rejected the pendent party
claim, but with a more diffused rationale. Then Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a six-judge majority, acknowledged that the logic of
Gibbs was relevant to the question of jurisdictional power, but ad
ded an additional test—the so-called congressional negative.83 Re
lying on the soon to be discredited reasoning from Part III of
Monroe v. Pape,84 Aldinger held that jurisdictional power over the
77. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
78. See supra note 31.
79. See Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977) (categorically re
jecting pendent party jurisdiction).
80. See Pendent Jurisdiction of Federal Court over State Claim Against Party not
Otherwise Subject to Federal Jurisdiction where State Claim is Sought to be Joined with
Claim Arising Under Laws, Treaties, or Constitution of United States (“Pendent Party”
Jurisdiction), 72 A.L.R. FED. 191, 220-25 (1985) (listing the First, Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth and Tenth Circuits as permitting pendent party jurisdiction and the Fourth, Sev
enth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as precluding such jurisdiction).
81. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 712-15 (1973).
82. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
83. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 415-19 (1976). The congressional
negative was also used to deny jurisdiction in Owen v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374-77
(1978) (no power over claim by plaintiff against non-diverse third-party defendant).
84. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-18 (1976). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
which in Parts I and II opened the flood gates for § 1983 litigation against individuals
(over the strong dissent of Justice Frankfurter who predicted the flood), holding that
the City of Chicago was not a “person” under § 1983 because the Congress of 1871
refused to add an unrelated provision, concerning municipal liability for the acts of
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pendent party claim was negated by congressional hostility to
claims against municipalities. This point was described as a “legal
difference” between Aldinger and Gibbs. 85 In addition, the Court
added a second point which it called a “factual” difference: “ If the
new party sought to be joined is not otherwise subject to federal
jurisdiction, there is a more serious obstacle to the exercise of pen
dent jurisdiction than if parties already before the court are re
quired to litigate a state-law claim.”86
Rather than categorically precluding pendent party claims
(which would have followed from the “factual” point) Justice Rehn
quist articulated a clear limit to the reach of the Court’s decision:
There are, of course, many variations in the language which Con
gress has employed to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts,
and we decide here only the issue of so-called “pendent party”
jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought under §§ 1343 (3) and
1983. Other statutory grants and other alignments of parties and
claims might call for a different result. When the grant of juris
diction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the pros
ecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience can
be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal
court may all of the claims be tried together.87

In 1989, the case Justice Rehnquist anticipated in the para
graph quoted above reached the Court: Finley v. United States.88
An airplane crash led to a claim against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and state law claims against other
defendants. Now the Chief Justices, both Rehnquist and Justice
White89 must have changed their view since they were two of the
four Justices who joined Justice Scalia’s five-judge majority opinion,
which threw this dictum from Aldinger under the bus.90 Like Ald
those they could not control (e.g., KKK), to the Act that included § 1983. The issue was
clarified in Part I of Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 664-89 (1978), which held in Part I that municipalities are “persons” under § 1983,
but in Part II rejecting respondeat superior liability and imposing a requirement that
liability be based upon a “custom” or “policy.”
85. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15-18.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id.
88. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
89. Along with Rehnquist, White was the only Justice on the Finley bench who
joined the Aldinger majority opinion.
90. The other two who joined the majority were Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
(not on the Court in 1976); Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in both
Aldinger and Finley; Justice Stevens was in the majority in Aldinger but dissented in
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inger, Finley relied on the same double barrel approach: (1) adding
a new party is frowned upon and (2) the FTCA suggested that Con
gress was hostile to the pendent claim.91 The pellucid efficiency
point from Aldinger was thus subordinated to a fanciful notion of
Congressional hostility toward combining federal claims against the
government and state claims against other defendants in a single
civil action, although all claims arose from a single accident.92
More importantly, Finley raised serious doubts about the via
bility of pendent jurisdiction, writ large.93 At the same time, recog
nizing that he had seriously roiled the waters, Justice Scalia
challenged Congress to assert what he viewed as its exclusive role in
determining the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction:
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by
a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What
is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate
against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may
know the effect of the language it adopts.94

It did not take Congress long to respond. The Federal Court
Study Committee (FCSC) had already been established by Con
gress (November 1988, effective date of January 1, 1989) and given
Finley, relying heavily on the language from Aldinger quoted in the text. Finley, 490
U.S. at 567-68.
91. Finley, 490 U.S. at 544-56.
92. The majority made this point with the following language:
Because the FTCA permits the Government to be sued only in federal court,
our holding that parties to related claims cannot necessarily be sued there
means that the efficiency and convenience of a consolidated action will some
times have to be forgone in favor of separate actions in state and federal
courts. We acknowledged this potential consideration in Aldinger, 427 U.S. at
18, but now conclude that the present statute permits no other result.
Id. at 555-56.
93. See H.R. Rep., No. 101-734, at 6874 (1990). “Recently, however, in Finley v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), the Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on the
authority of the federal courts to hear some claims within supplemental jurisdiction.”
Id.; see also Wolf, supra note 14, at 13 (“Indeed, in Finley, the Court appeared to cast
doubt on the Gibbs case itself, suggesting that congressional authorization is necessary,
at least where new parties are joined, before the courts may invoke supplemental
jurisdiction.”).
Clearly Justice Scalia wanted to “impair” Gibbs, if not overrule it. But it would
appear that he did not have the votes. Thus, when he said “[t]he Gibbs line of cases
was a departure from prior practice, and a departure that we have no intent to limit or
impair” it would seem he was speaking for the majority, not himself. Finley, 490 U.S. at
556 (emphasis added).
94. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
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a broad charge.95 Finley added a measure of urgency to the topic
(as it was then known) of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.96
Chaired by Third Circuit Judge Joseph Weis, the FCSC Final Re
port, dated April 2, 1990, contained, among other recommenda
tions, one that “Congress should expressly authorize federal courts
to assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an independent
federal jurisdictional base.”97 This report did not contain a specific
proposal, although the non-authoritative working papers did go
further.98
The primary focus of the FCSC was on jurisdictional power,
and was reflected in § 1367(a)99 and in § 1367(b) which limited sub
section (a) power in certain diversity cases.100 The FCSC report
contained the following brief reference to discretionary dismissals:
In order to minimize friction between state and federal courts,
however, Congress should direct federal courts to dismiss state
claims if these claims predominate or if they present novel or

95. Pub. L. 100-702, Title I, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4644. Section 102(b) of the
Act described the purposes of the FCSC as follows: “The purposes of the Committee
are to—(1) examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United
States; [and] (2) develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary . . . .”
Id.
96. Finley, 490 U.S. at 545-54.
97. Federal Court Study Committee, Report of The Fed. Courts Study Comm.,
47-48 (April 2, 1990) [Hereinafter “FCSC Report”].
98. In the FCSC working papers, dated July 1, 1990, there is a more detailed
discussion of supplemental jurisdiction as well as a proposed statute; the working pa
pers were expressly not adopted by the FCSC, and in the introduction to the March 12,
1990 Report of the Sub-committee on the Federal Courts and their Relation to the
States, contained in the working papers, the following note appears: “Not every mem
ber of the subcommittee has agreed to all of the proposals or analysis contained in this
[March 12, 1990] Report, and the absence of dissent should not be understood to signify
approval.” Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Subcommittee on the
Role of the Federal Courts and their Relation to the States (Mar. 12, 1990). But see
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 569-70 (2005) (where the
Court failed to note this point as it equates conflicting views on § 1367(b) from the
House Report and the working papers).
99. The Congressional goal of § 1367(a) was to restore the “power” paragraph
from Gibbs and apply it to both new claims and new parties; that is, to overturn Ald
inger and Finley. The text of subsection (a) and the House Report discussion of that
subsection are consistent, and no court has had any trouble with the provision. United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
100. The Congressional goal was to codify Owen v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978),
as homage to the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267
(1806).
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complex questions of state law, or if dismissal is warranted in the
particular case by considerations of fairness or economy.101

The original version of what was to become § 1367 began with
a proposal submitted on June 8, 1990 directly to the chair of the
House Judiciary Committee102 by Professors Arthur Wolf and John
Egnal.103 In this version, subsection (c) restricted discretionary
power to dismiss supplemental claims to three situations: (1) the
federal claim was dismissed104 (2) the supplemental claim substan
tially predominates105 or (3) the federal and supplemental claims
should be tried separately.106 In addition, this version required fed
eral judges to “file . . . a written statement of reasons for the dismis
sal”107 and contained no catch-all provision.
This original version, § 120 of House Bill 5381,108 was substan
tially replaced by a version promoted by Judge Weis, which was
based on the proposed statute in the FCSC working papers.109 In
the Weis proposal, subsection (c) included the first two grounds for
discretionary dismissal from the original with one change–the elimi
nation of the word “substantially” from what was to become
§ 1367(c)(2).110 In addition, this version added two grounds: “the
101. FCSC Report, supra note 97, at 47-48. Note the unusual use of “fairness or
economy” as a reason for dismissal. See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text
(standing the terms on their heads as a means of excluding claims from federal jurisdic
tion rather than including them).
102. Hearings, supra note 40, at 686 (containing letter to the chair of the Commit
tee, Robert W. Kastenmeier).
103. Id. at 27-31 (describing the Wolf-Egnal Proposal).
104. Adopted as § 1367(c)(3).
105. Adopted as § 1367(c)(2).
106. Not adopted.
107. Hearings, supra note 40 at 30, 688.
108. H.R. 5381, 101st Cong. (1990).
109. Wolf, supra note 14, at 16-20 (1992) (providing a detailed description of
these events). Actually there were two similar proposals—one from Judge Weis, Hear
ings, supra note 40 at 98, and the other from Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler,
Hearings supra note 40 at 722. As to subsection (c) they are the same, down to the typo
in the first line. This version of § 1367(c) will be referred to as the Weis proposal:
(c) The districts [sic] courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex
issue of State law, (2) the claim under subsection (a) predominates over the
claim or claims for which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the
district court has dismissed all claims for which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) there are other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, conve
nience, and fairness to the litigants, for declining jurisdiction.
Id.
110. Hearings, supra note 40 at 30, 98. Compare Hearings, supra note 40 at 98
(the Weis proposal, which omitted the word “substantially”), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(2) (2006) (retaining the word “substantially”).

2012] JURY CONFUSION AND DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS 103

[supplemental] claim raise[d] a novel or complex issue of state
law”111 and a broad catch-all provision with the following, puzzling
language: “(4) there are other appropriate reasons, such as judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants, for declining
jurisdiction.”112 The language is puzzling because the reasons set
forth in this version of (c)(4) are not reasons to dismiss; rather, they
are reasons to retain a supplemental claim.113 According to Gibbs,
the “justification [for pendent jurisdiction] lies in considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants”;114 it was
the absence of these reasons that would suggest that discretionary
dismissal might be appropriate. It may be that Judge Weis was
thinking about economy and convenience for the federal trial
judges and not so much about Gibbs’s obvious concern with overall
judicial economy and “convenience and fairness to litigants.”115
The House subcommittee116 made two changes to the Weis
version: first, “substantially” was restored to § 1367(c)(2)117 and
second, Weis’s (c)(4) catch-all was totally rewritten to read: “(4) in
exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.”118 No official document explains these
changes.119 Clearly, the Congressional drafters wanted to limit, not
expand, the use of discretionary dismissals. This was the version
111. Adopted as 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2006).
112. Hearings, supra note 40 at 30, 98.
113. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
114. Id.
115. Id. (emphasis added); sometimes defendants want a single lawsuit as much
as plaintiffs; more often defendants want to frustrate plaintiffs.
116. Drafting was done by Committee staff; no members involved. See Wolf,
supra note 14, at 17.
117. Although this was a minor change, it was clearly aimed at adding to the
constraints on the use of discretionary dismissals. Supra note 110.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006).
119. For a further discussion of this legislative change, see Wolf, supra note 14 at
25. “Although the hearings do not reflect it, other consultants to the subcommittee
criticized the Weis substitute after the hearing on September 6th. [n.145: ‘Conversation
with Charles G. Geyh.’] They thought the discretion given to judges under the substi
tute to dismiss the non-federal claims was too broad.” Wolf, supra note 14, at 25. That
is, the Weis version gave too much discretion to trial judges, which would undermine
the basic goal of § 1367(a). Note that the FCSC working papers approach to discretion
is at odds with the action taken by the Congressional drafters. Following the recom
mendation to expressly authorize supplemental jurisdiction, the working papers add:
“In addition, we recommend that Congress direct the courts to decline to exercise juris
diction more often then they do at present.” FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE,
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMM. REP. Volume I, 559 (July 1, 1990). Professor Freer’s
view of the replacement of Judge Weis’s version of (c)(4) is that “for some reason, it
was removed before the final draft was approved.” RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCE
DURE 220 (2d ed. Aspen 2009).
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that was adopted by Congress and signed into law by President
George H. W. Bush.120
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental juris
diction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a
novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially
predominates over the claim or claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in excep
tional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for de
clining jurisdiction.121

The phrase “jury confusion,” which was clearly part of the pre
1990 case law, was never explicitly included in any version of the
text.122 The Weis catch-all, “there are other appropriate reasons,
such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants,
for declining jurisdiction” would easily include jury confusion as a
permissible ground for dismissal.123 However, the clause which au
thorized dismissal for any “appropriate reason” was rejected by the
drafters and replaced with language that imposed significant textual
limitations.124
Rather than resolve the status of “jury confusion,” the House
Report125 ignored the point. Its entire coverage of subsection (c) is
the following puzzling paragraph:
Subsection [1367](c) codifies the factors that the Supreme Court
has recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a dis
trict court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim,
even though it is empowered to hear the claim. Subsection
(c)(1)-(3) codifies the factors recognized as relevant under cur
rent law. Subsection (c)(4) acknowledges that occasionally there
may exist other compelling reasons for a district court to decline
supplemental jurisdiction, which the subsection does not fore
close a court from considering in exceptional circumstances. As
under current law, subsection (c) requires the district court, in
exercising its discretion, to undertake a case-specific analysis.126
120. Wolf, supra note 14, at 2.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4).
122. Id.
123. Wolf, supra note 14, at 24-25.
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
125. There was no Senate report for this statute.
126. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. REP.
NO. 101-734, at 29 (1990).
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If one only considered the first sentence and viewed it as au
thoritative (while ignoring the rest of the paragraph and the text of
subsection (c)), there would be no doubt that risk of jury confusion
would be an appropriate ground for discretionary dismissal. How
ever, the second sentence of this paragraph undermines such a con
clusion. The so-called codification of prior case law is said to be
reflected in § 1367(1)-(3).127 Clearly, none of these three subsec
tions has anything to do with jury confusion.128 As such, if “jury
confusion” survived the statute, it could only be in (c)(4). But
(c)(4) dismissals are limited to “exceptional circumstances,” and
jury confusion could hardly be characterized as “exceptional.”129
One way to correct this obvious conflict and bring the text and
House Report into alignment would be to read the words “some
of” into the first sentence, so the House Report would read, “codi
fies some of the factors.” Such an interpretation would underscore
the omission from the statute of jury confusion as a ground for dis
cretionary dismissal. Or one could ignore the text and the second
sentence of the House Report and simply follow pre-1990 case law.
As we will see, the federal courts have done both.
IV. JURY CONFUSION UNDER § 1367(C)(4)
Before proceeding to an analysis of the case law under
§ 1367(c)(4), there are two indisputable points that should be men
tioned: first, a discretionary dismissal of a claim within the court’s
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) must be based upon
§ 1367(c), and second, the risk of jury confusion is not any part of
(c)(1), (2) or (3).130 Explicit articulation of the need to use
§ 1367(c) for discretionary dismissals appears in Executive Software
North America, Inc. v. United States District Court:
[I]t is clear that Congress intended section 1367(c) to provide the
exclusive means by which supplemental jurisdiction can be de
clined by a court. Not only is this conclusion supported by the
legislative history . . . , but a contrary reading of the statute would
appear to render section 1367(c) superfluous.131
127. Id.
128. The closest is subsection (1), which is about judge (not jury) confusion. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(1).
129. See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(3) (2006).
131. Executive Software North America, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent.
Dist. of Calif., 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (reversing the dis
missal of a supplemental claim where the trial court gave no reason for the dismissal);
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The self-evident fact that jury confusion is not within
§ 1367(c)(1), (2) or (3) was mentioned supra, at the end of Part III.
What is less evident, and worth repeating132 is the policies shared
by the three judge-made grounds Congress did adopt, as distin
guished from jury confusion, the ground Congress did not adopt.
Any supplemental claim dismissed under (c)(1), (2) or (3) can read
ily be said to belong in state court.133 The same cannot be said
about a claim that might lead to jury confusion if included in a trial
with a related federal claim.
A. Post-1990 Judicial Decisions: the District Courts Divide on
Jury Confusion 134
Focusing on the outcomes of decided cases, the overall picture
of motions to dismiss supplemental claims135 based on the likeli
hood of jury confusion did not change with the adoption of
§ 1367—some were granted and some were denied. Most, but not
all136 courts recognized that the statute did change the name from
“pendent” to “supplemental.” As far as the impact of the statute,
there was a wide divergence.
Prior to 1990, a court faced with such a motion to dismiss a
supplemental claim would have to assess the reasons for the likeli
hood of confusion and the availability of means to reduce or elimi
nate that confusion, and then place this analysis on the scale of
discretion.137 Since the adoption of the statute, some, but not all,
courts recognize that a new threshold issue has emerged: whether
see also Feezor v. Tesstab Operations Grp., Inc., 524 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1224 (S.D. Cal.
2007) (“Once the court acquires supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, section
1367(c) provides the only valid basis upon which it may decline to exercise it.”).
132. See supra notes 35-46.
133. Because it is the only claim left in the lawsuit, it is the predominant claim, or
it is a claim that should be settled by a state, not a federal judge.
134. The discussion starts with district court decisions, since no appellate court
has dealt directly with the issue.
135. In this part, the term “supplemental” will be used, even for pre-1990 cases;
“supplemental” and “pendent” are synonymous.
136. See Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 1995) (in
lawsuit filed in 1993, “pendent” used at least six times and “supplemental” once in
reporting the outcome of another post-1990 decided case).
137. This assumes the court took the motion seriously; as we have seen, some
courts reflexively dismiss all supplemental claims. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Detroit,
No. 10-13179, 2010 WL 4259835, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (exercising the court’s discre
tion to dismiss the supplemental claims).
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jury confusion is an appropriate ground on which to base a discre
tionary dismissal.138
Many opinions have ignored this question, and assumed that
the statute made no change in the appropriate grounds.139 These
opinions mostly result in dismissal of the supplemental claim, while
some deny the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the risk of jury
confusion is not great or can be ameliorated.140 Some opinions ac
knowledge the threshold issue.141 Of that group, a few make an
attempt to support the view that jury confusion is an appropriate
ground on which to base dismissal,142 while most opinions that fo
cus on this threshold issue conclude that the risk of jury confusion
as an appropriate ground for dismissal has been eliminated by the
statute.143
1. Risk of Jury Confusion as a Ground for Dismissal
An oft-cited example of a post-1990 decision dismissing (and
remanding to state court) supplemental claims solely on the ground
of potential jury confusion is Padilla v. City of Saginaw.144 This
excessive force civil rights action, asserting both federal and state
claims, was filed in state court and properly removed to federal
court.145 Plaintiff then moved to remand the entire case.146 After
rejecting the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), the court, appar
ently on its own motion,147 retained jurisdiction over the federal
138. See, e.g., Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F.Supp. 1309, 1315 (E.D. Mich.
1994) (“The potential for jury confusion can be a sufficiently compelling reason for
declining jurisdiction.”).
139. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1562 n.3
(11th Cir. 1994) (“Formerly known as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, such grounds
for the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction have now been codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1367.”).
140. See, e.g., Rosen v. Change, 758 F.Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1991) (noting that
“concerns [regarding jury confusion] . . . are outweighed by the furtherance of judicial
economy in trying these closely related claims together, particularly when clear jury
instructions may alleviate any juror confusion”).
141. Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315; LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare
Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413, 1414-15 (D. Colo. 1993); 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, AR
THUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 3567.1 n.46 (3d ed. 2008).
142. See, e.g., Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315.
143. LaSorella, 818 F.Supp. at 1415.
144. Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1309.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. According to the docket entries, the defendants never moved to dismiss the
supplemental claims; rather, the only motion before Judge Cleland was the plaintiff’s
motion to remand the entire case to state court. Id.
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claims while it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the closely related state law claims, relying on § 1367(c)(4).148 The
opinion contains one paragraph in support the assertion that the
risk of jury confusion was an appropriate ground for dismissal.149
That paragraph includes a reference to the Supreme Court’s 1973
decision of Moor v. Alameda and a sentence from the Wright,
Miller & Cooper treatise,150 which relied, for its statement, on the
1966 Gibbs decision. The opinion then contains four paragraphs
supporting the assertion that the risk of jury confusion is great (i.e.
compelling) while ignoring the question whether this compelling
risk is exceptional.151 Finally, the court notes “that the advantages
to be gained by trying these claims together are outweighed by the
potential for confusion of the issues by the jury.152 Thus, remand of
all state law claims is appropriate.”153
Judge Cleland has continued to dismiss supplemental claims on
the ground of jury confusion, often sua sponte.154 His more recent
opinions include a paragraph, noticeably absent from Padilla, ad
dressing the (c)(4) requirement that the situation be exceptional.155
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1314-17.
Id.
Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315 (1994).
The potential for jury confusion can be a sufficiently compelling reason
for declining jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has cited jury
confusion in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law as a proper
reason for a district court to decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 . . . (1973). Wright, Miller & Cooper identify
jury confusion as a sound reason for a district court to remand state law claims
over which it has supplemental jurisdiction. “One example of this [exceptional
circumstance under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4)] might be the possibility of jury
confusion, which was recognized in Gibbs as a reason for declining jurisdic
tion.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3567.1, n. 46.
Id.
151. Padilla, 867 F.Supp. at 1315-16.
152. Id. at 1316-17.
153. Id. at 1317. The following sentence preceded the one quoted in the text:
“There will be some duplication of effort required by the prosecution and defense of
this case in two courts if the plaintiff decides to pursue her federal claims.” Id. at 1316.
“Plaintiff’s counsel intimated at oral argument that Plaintiff might prefer to abandon
her federal claims rather than pursue them in federal court.” Id. at n.5.
154. See Barnes v. Hayse, No. 10-12501, 2010 WL 3448377 (E.D.Mich. 2010);
King v. City of Detroit, No. 10-12133, 2010 WL 2813349 (E.D.Mich. 2010); Orr v. City
of Roseville, No. 10-11389, 2010 WL 2595533 (E.D.Mich. 2010). Other decisions to the
same effect include Riza v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-12605, 2009 WL 3756685
(E.D.Mich. 2009) (relying on Padilla), Walker v. City of Detroit, No. 10-13179, 2010 WL
4259835 (E.D.Mich. 2010), and Young v. Bank of Boston Conn., No. 3:93 CV 1642
(AVC), 1996 WL 756504 (D.Conn. 1996).
155. Walker, 2010 WL 4259835 at *3.
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However, what is said to be exceptional is simply the standard preGibbs rationale for dismissal based on the risk of jury confusion:
The court finds that exceptional circumstances are present in this
case in weighing the likelihood of jury confusion, judicial ineffi
ciency, substantial inconvenience to the parties, and potential un
fairness in outcome which could readily result by attempting to
resolve all claims in a single trial.156

Another rationale that often accompanies the dismissal of sup
plemental claims comes from the first sentence of the relevant para
graph of the House Report157—the simplistic idea that § 1367(c)
was a codification of Gibbs and its progeny. Thus in German v.
Eslinger,158 an excessive force civil rights claim, the sua sponte dis
missal of the supplemental claims was based on the view that § 1367
was simply a codification of Gibbs,159 supported by cases which re
lied only on pre-1990 decisions.160
Some courts, while denying a motion to dismiss a supplemental
claim, nevertheless tacitly acknowledge that risk of jury confusion is
an appropriate ground on which to base a dismissal.161 Such deci
sions conclude that in the case at bar, the risk of confusion is not
great or that the policies that favor retention of the supplemental
claim outweigh the risk of confusion. Thus in Rosen v. Chang,162 a
prisoner wrongful death claim, the court held that under federal law
the defendants could be held liable in their individual capacities,
and that it would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
state law claims, despite the risk of jury confusion. “Such concerns
[about jury confusion], however, are outweighed by the furtherance
of judicial economy in trying these closely related claims together,
particularly when clear jury instructions may alleviate any juror
confusion.”163
156. Id. at *6.
157. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, supra note 126, at 29.
158. German v. Eslinger, No. 6:08-CV-845-ORL-22GJK, 2008 WL 2915071
(M.D.Fla. 2008).
159. The court did not differentiate between Gibbs’ relevance to § 1367(a) and
§ 1367(c). Id.
160. See Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1562 n.3 (11th
Cir. 1994); James v. Sun Glass Hut of Cal., Inc., 799 F.Supp. 1083, 1084 (D.Colo. 1992);
see also Zelaya v. J.M. Macias, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 778, 783 (E.D.N.C.1998) (FLSA class
action; state and federal claims would result in distinct classes; one paragraph to dismiss
supplemental claims based on jury confusion; no discussion).
161. Rosen v. Chang, 758 F.Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1991).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 803; see also McLaurin v. Prestage Foods, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 465
(E.D.N.C. 2010) (certifying class and upholding supplemental jurisdiction over state
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2. Risk of Jury Confusion Rejected as a Ground for
Dismissal
Some district courts have explicitly rejected the view that
under the 1990 statute, the risk of jury confusion is still a proper
ground for discretionary dismissal. For example, in LaSorella v.
Penrose St. Francis Healthcare System, an age discrimination civil
rights case, the plaintiff joined both federal and state law claims
against the defendant, who promptly moved to dismiss the state law
claims under both § 1367(c)(2) and (c)(4).164 The court quickly re
jected the (c)(2) argument that the state law claim predominated
and then turned to the contention that if jurisdiction were retained,
there would be a risk of jury confusion.165
LaSorella rejected several opinions which it suggested sup
ported the notion that § 1367(c) was a total codification of Gibbs
and its progeny.166
Most [courts] have uncritically suggested that the [Judicial Im
provement Act]167 is merely a codification of the old pendant
jurisdiction doctrine, thus allowing them to continue to rely on
Gibbs. See, e.g., Walter Fuller Aircraft v. Republic of Philippines,
965 F.2d 1375, 1389 n. 13 (5th Cir.1992); Promisel v. First Ameri
can Artif. Flowers, 943 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir.1991); Sinclair v.
Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir.1991). Some sections of
the JIA’s legislative history suggest such an interpretation. See
H.Rep. No. 101-734, 101st Cong.2d Sess., 27-29, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6873-75.168
claims, subordinating claimed jury confusion to broader efficiency concerns in an FLSA
case); Lucarino v. Con-Dive, LLC, No. H-09-2548, 2010 WL 2196233 (S.D.Tex. May 27,
2010) (retaining supplemental jurisdiction; upholding prior decision); Lucarino v. ConDive, LLC, No. H-09-2548, 2010 WL 786546, at *3-4 (S.D.Tex. March 5, 2010) (consid
ering and rejecting jury confusion); Heinemann v. Howe & Rusling, 260 F.Supp.2d 592
(W.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying on Miller v. Lovett).
164. LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413 (D. Colo.
1993).
165. Id. at 1414.
166. Id. at 1415.
167. The Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990),
contained eight titles; pertinent to this article is Title III, Implementation of Federal
Courts Study Committee Recommendations, also known as the Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act of 1990. This Act contained a number of so-called
non-controversial matters that had been proposed by the Federal Courts Study Com
mittee, including Supplemental Jurisdiction, which when adopted was codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
168. LaSorella, 818 F.Supp. at 1415.
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These cases cited by LaSorella concerned subsection (a), which
can be fairly characterized as a simple codification of the Gibbs
doctrine.169 Thus, Judge Kane cited to the wrong cases as standing
for the point that as to discretionary dismissals, Gibbs was codi
fied.170 As to the specific statement in the House Report concern
ing subsection (c) that it “codifies the factors that the Supreme
Court has recognized,”171 Judge Kane correctly stated, “[t]his pas
sage is simply wrong and I reject it in favor of the plain meaning
and language of [§ 1367(c)].”172 One additional reference from the
Wright, Miller & Cooper treatise is worth noting: “The circum
stances in which a court may exercise discretion to refuse to hear a
case are quite strictly defined.”173
Other district courts have followed the lead of LaSorella.174
For example, in Gard v. Teletronics Pacing Systems, Inc., a civil
rights case involving claims of age discrimination and sexual harass
ment, the court refused to consider the risk of jury confusion in
connection with the defendant’s motion to dismiss the supplemental
claims.175
B. Post-1990 Judicial Decisions: The Appellate Courts Have Not
Dealt Directly with the Issue
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the issue at hand. Of the six cases where the Court mentioned
§ 1367(c), only one contained any discussion of the operation of
that subsection. In City of Chicago v. International College of Sur
geons,176 the Court reinstated the trial court’s decision that it had
169. Id.
170. Those cases are discussed in the previous paragraphs.
171. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, supra note 126, at 29 (setting forth the language of
the House Report).
172. LaSorella, 818 F.Supp. at 1416. The opinion continued with the following
footnote: “Professor Oakley suggests that the late night legislative action that accompa
nied the passage of [§ 1367] may be responsible for some of the oddities of the present
statute.” Id. at 1416 n.1 (citing John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of
Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24
U.C.DAVIS L.REV. 735, 736 n.2 (1991)). Professor Oakley had more to say on this
point, which will be discussed infra in Part IV.C (scholarship).
173. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3567.3 at 39 (2d ed. Supp 1992). Recall, prior
footnote 150, that Padilla also relied on the Wright, Miller & Cooper treatise, albeit a
different section. This discrepancy will be addressed in Part IV.C.
174. See, e.g., Gard v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 859 F.Supp. 1349, 1351-52
(D.Colo. 1994).
175. Id. at 1349-52.
176. City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 174 (1997).
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federal question177 and supplemental jurisdiction178 over the plain
tiffs’ claims, which the Seventh Circuit had reversed. In Part III,
the Court made clear that the trial court had not yet ruled on a
motion to dismiss the supplemental claims based upon § 1367(c),
and that it would not address that issue in the first instance.179 The
Court nevertheless went on to describe in broad terms the notion of
discretionary authority to dismiss supplemental claims, quoting
from Gibbs 180 and another pre-1990 decision, Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill.181 The Court did not discuss the text, legislative
history, or lower court decisions interpreting § 1367(c). But while
this short, unsupported discussion182 is consistent with the view that
the statute made no change in prior case law,183 it lends no more
than superficial support to such a view.
The courts of appeal have had more to say about the operation
of § 1367(c), but none has addressed the specific question whether
the risk of jury confusion has survived the 1990 codification. Most
of these appellate decisions concern the application of subsections
(c)(1), (c)(2) and (c)(3), each of which has an antecedent in pre
1990 case law184 and identifies a specific type of case that would be
appropriate for discretionary dismissal. A few courts of appeal
have addressed subsection (c)(4).185 For example, in Executive
Software North America, Inc. v. United States District Court,186 the
district court remanded the supplemental (state law discrimination)
claims while retaining jurisdiction of the properly removed federal
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
179. City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 172-74.
180. Id. at 172 (“[P]endent jurisdiction ‘is a doctrine of discretion, not of plain
tiff’s right . . . .’”) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966)).
181. Id. at 172-73 (“[W]e have indicated that ‘district courts [should] deal with
cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of econ
omy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doc
trine.’”) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)).
182. Part III is four paragraphs long and covers two full pages. City of Chicago,
522 U.S. at 172-74.
183. Professor Oakley had this to say about Carnegie-Mellon: “Because the case
in question was being remanded to the Seventh Circuit, the Court’s framing of the is
sues left open on remand in terms of the governing law of the relevant circuit does not
support the inference that the Supreme Court has sub silentio resolved an unacknowl
edged circuit split.” John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Fed
eral Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 943 n.381 (1998).
184. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
185. Exec. Software N. Am. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Cal., 24
F.3d 1545, 1557-61 (9th Cir. 1994).
186. Id. at 1548.
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discrimination claims. The trial judge gave no reason, but did indi
cate his view that § 1367(c) had simply codified prior case law.187
Though not reported, the Ninth Circuit quoted from the trial
judge’s opinion as follows:
Even if [the Gibbs test is] met, however, a federal court has dis
cretion to decline jurisdiction over state law claims if, for in
stance, the state claims substantially predominate, the state
claims involve novel or complex issues of state law, trial of the
state and federal claims together is likely to result in jury confu
sion, or retention of the state claims requires the expenditure of
substantial additional judicial time and effort. [Gibbs, 383 U.S.]
at 726-27 . . . ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 . . . (1988).
The Removing Party(ies) should also be aware that this
Court does not interpret the 1990 enactment of Section 1367 as
restricting the discretionary factors set forth in Gibbs. Rather,
this Court interprets Section 1367 as merely allowing this Court,
at its discretion, to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental par
ties, which was previously foreclosed by Finley v. United States,
490 U.S. 545 . . . (1989).188

The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that failure to give any rea
son for failing to accept supplemental jurisdiction was an abuse of
discretion.189 After noting that a discretionary dismissal of a sup
plemental claim could only be accomplished under § 1367(c) and
that subsections (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) did not appear to apply,
the court articulated its view that subsection (c)(4) narrowed the
scope of a trial court’s discretion:
[S]ubsection (c)(4), which also permits a court to decline jurisdic
tion when, “in exceptional circumstances, there are other com
pelling reasons,” channels the district court’s discretion to
identify new grounds for declining jurisdiction more particularly
than did preexisting doctrine. Accordingly, we conclude the dis
trict court erred to the extent that it relied on a basis for remand
ing pendent claims not permitted under section 1367(c). Finally,
we conclude that, because the district court failed to articulate
187. Id. at 1551.
188. Id. at 1548-49.
189. Id. at 1562. To the same effect as Executive Software is McLaurin v. Prater,
30 F.3d 982, 985-86 (8th Cir. 1994) (remanded due to failure to give a reason for dis
missing supplemental claim; on the merits court ruled for plaintiff on the § 1983 claim).
The same result would have been reached prior to 1990. See, e.g., Miller v. Lovett , 879
F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (giving no reason for refusing to exercise supplemen
tal jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion).
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reasons for its remand of the pendent claims, we cannot deter
mine whether the district court relied on a statutory ground and
exercised its discretion in a permissible manner. Consequently,
we conclude that the district court clearly erred.190

But the Ninth Circuit never addressed the question whether
the risk of jury confusion could be a “new ground” under (c)(4). In
footnote 14, the court cites to two district court decisions and sug
gests a divide on this question,191 concluding: “[w]e intimate no
view on the matter.”192 Several other courts of appeal have agreed
with the Ninth Circuit that the statute has narrowed the scope of
the trial judge’s discretion to dismiss supplemental claims, but none
have addressed the availability of jury confusion as a permissible
ground.193
Other courts of appeal have parted company with the Ninth
Circuit and reached the same conclusion as the trial judge in Execu
tive Software, that § 1367(c) does not “restrict[ ] the discretionary
factors set forth in Gibbs.”194 This language would seem to support
the idea that risk of jury confusion is an appropriate ground on
which to base a § 1367(c) dismissal. However, none of these appel
late decisions involves such a fact pattern. The discussion of discre
tion has been in the context of § 1367(c)(1), (2), or (3).195 But while
this split of the circuits has been one focus of the § 1367(c) scholar
ship,196 we will see in the next part that none of it addresses the
status of risk of jury confusion.
190. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1551-51 (emphasis added).
191. LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413, 1415 (D.
Colo. 1993) (finding jury confusion is not within the statute); Picard v. Bay Area Reg’l
Transit Dist., 823 F.Supp. 1519 (N.D.Cal. 1993) (suggesting that jury confusion is a per
missible ground but finding no risk of confusion in this case).
192. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1560.
193. See Rachel Ellen Hinkle, The Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Debate
Over the District Court’s Discretion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, 69 TENN. L.
REV. 111, 120, 130-34 (2001) (listing the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits as
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit); see also Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience:
The Problem of Federal Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 125-27 (2006)
(listing the Second, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits as reading § 1367(c) as cur
tailing the Gibbs approach to discretion).
194. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1548; see Hinkle, supra note 193 at 121-30 (listing
the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits as reading § 1367(c) as preserv
ing the Gibbs approach to discretion).
195. Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1548.
196. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3567.3 at 39 (2d ed. Supp 1992).
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C. Post-1990 Scholarship
A burst of scholarship followed almost immediately upon the
passage of § 1367.197 Its primary focus was the obvious drafting er
ror in § 1367(b), the subsection intended to limit supplemental ju
risdiction in certain diversity-only lawsuits.198 Little attention was
paid to § 1367(c), but to the extent it was discussed, the earliest
articles tended to support the view that § 1367(c) was simply a codi
fication of Gibbs.199
Thus in 1991, Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler de
scribe subsection (c) as follows: “It codifies those factors that the
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs recognized as pro
viding a sound basis for a lower court’s discretionary decision to
decline supplemental jurisdiction.”200 Later in 1991, Professor
Freer expressed the same view in a short paragraph describing
§ 1367(c): “Thus, the statute basically codifies the teaching of Gibbs
regarding the discretionary decline of supplemental jurisdiction.”201
In 1992, Professor Steinman was heard from.202 She begins her dis
cussion of § 1367(c)(4) in tune with the (c) codified Gibbs view,203
but does acknowledge that the text might support a restriction in
the permissible scope of discretion: “It is not apparent to me that
[the risk of jury confusion] would constitute a compelling reason”
under § 1367(c)(4).204 Eschewing further analysis of Congressional
intent, she adds, “It is a more difficult question whether such a cur
tailment of the courts’ discretion is or would be a good thing.”205
And there the discussion of (c)(4) ends, “[b]ecause of my desire to
discuss other matters and because I think that few judicial decisions
197. See supra note 55.
198. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (resolving
the drafting problem).
199. See supra notes 53-57, 125-29, and 158-69 and accompanying text.
200. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M. Mengler, Congress
Accepts Supreme Court’s Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICA
TURE 213, 216 (1991) (citing only to Gibbs).
201. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life
After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 472 (1991)
(citing only to § 1367(c) and to Gibbs).
202. Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party Heard From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85
(1992).
203. Id. at 85-96 (relying primarily on the FCSC report and the first sentence of
the relevant paragraph from the House Report).
204. Id. at 94.
205. Id.
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are likely to be altered by § 1367(c)(4)’s language, I will not delve
any further into this matter here.”206
Some of the scholarship lends some support to the view that
§ 1367(c) does narrow the scope of discretion.207 Professor
Oakley’s 1991 discussion of § 1367(c) starts with the following sup
port for the narrow view:
By the juxtaposition of sections 1367(a) and 1367(c) Congress ap
pears to have created a strong presumption in favor of the exer
cise of supplemental jurisdiction. Section 1367(a) grants the
jurisdiction in mandatory terms (“shall have supplemental juris
diction”) subject to section 1367(c)’s rather strict standards for
when the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.208

But in the next sentence, he suggests an important role for Gibbs:
“These standards combine the language of discretion found in
Gibbs with the language of abstention.”209 Seven years later, Pro
fessor Oakley was no closer to a resolution of this issue: “There are
manifest discrepancies between Gibbs’ standards and the text of
subsection 1367(c); the circuits are split as to whether these discrep
ancies should be overlooked.”210 Clearer support for the view that
the pre-1990 discretion was narrowed by the statute comes from
Professor Wolf:
Congress altered the approach of Gibbs that “pendent jurisdic
tion is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” If a liti
gant satisfies the criteria for jurisdiction under subsection (a),
then the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims . . . .” Thus, Congress converted a doctrine of
judicial discretion to a claim of right, even though it retained
some discretion, in § 1367(c), for the courts to dismiss supple
mental claims.211

As to the scope of that discretion, Professor Wolf suggested that
compared to Gibbs, “the statute might be viewed as narrowing such
discretion since it allows such exercises in only four limited circum
206. Id.
207. John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction
and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
735 (1991).
208. Id. at 766.
209. Id.
210. Oakley, supra note 183, at 943.
211. Arthur D. Wolf, Comment on the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: 28
U.S.C. § 1367, 74 IND. L.J. 223, 226 (1998) (emphasis added).
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stances.”212 In an earlier article, Professor Wolf pointed out how
the changes made in the text of § 1367(c)(4) left no doubt that Con
gress intended to narrow the scope of judicial discretion.213
The two major procedure treatises have reported the divisions
in the interpretation of § 1367(c)(4).214 As noted in Part IV.A,215
two of the early district court opinions, one going each way, each
relied upon the Wright, Miller and Cooper Treatise. In Padilla v.
City of Saginaw,216 a 1994 wrongful death civil rights case where the
removed federal claims were retained but the supplemental state
court claims were remanded to state court, the opinion included the
following quote from the Treatise:
Wright, Miller & Cooper identify jury confusion as a sound rea
son for a district court to remand state law claims over which it
has supplemental jurisdiction. “One example of this [exceptional
circumstance under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4)] might be the possibil
ity of jury confusion, which was recognized in Gibbs as a reason
for declining jurisdiction.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice & Procedure, § 3567.1, n. 46.217

A year earlier in an employment discrimination case, LaSorella
v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare System,218 the court held that the
risk of jury confusion was not an appropriate ground under
§ 1367(c), and also relied on the same treatise: “As Wright and
Miller put it, ‘The circumstances in which a court may exercise dis
cretion to refuse to hear a case are quite strictly defined.’ 13B C.
Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3567.3 at 39 (2d ed. Supp.1992).”219
Nearly twenty years later, neither of the above references has
survived intact. The current version of the treatise has this to say
about jury confusion: “Perhaps [§ 1367(c)(4)’s] concern with ‘ex
ceptional circumstances’ includes the Gibbs concern with things
such as the likelihood of jury confusion, but the statute does not say
212. Id. at 227.
213. Wolf, supra note 14, at 24-25; see supra notes 78-126 (providing the details of
the drafting of § 1367).
214. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE–CIVIL
§ 106.60[1] (2012).
215. See supra note 144 and Part IV.A.
216. Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F.Supp. 1309 (E.D.Mich. 1994).
217. Id. at 1315 (brackets by the court; the treatise relies on Gibbs).
218. LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F.Supp. 1413 (D. Colo.
1993).
219. Id. at 1416.
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so.”220 This quote is followed by reports of cases going both
ways.221
As to the status of jury confusion as a ground for discretionary
dismissal, Moore’s treatise on Federal Practice is less precise, but
equally equivocal.222 Moore first cites circuits expressing the “View
That [the] Statute Codifies [the] Gibbs Factors,”223 and in the next
section cites circuits with the “View That [the] Statute Alters Com
mon Law Analysis”224—circuits rejecting the simplistic “nothing
was changed by the statute” approach.225 This latter section no
where mentions jury confusion, and as noted earlier, neither do any
of the circuit cases in this group.226 The treatise makes no effort to
analyze or reconcile these seemingly conflicting lines of cases.227
V.

ANALYSIS: JURY CONFUSION

IS

NOT WITHIN § 1367(C)(4)

Part II of this Article makes it clear that for the nearly twenty
five years between Gibbs and the adoption of § 1367, there was no
controversy concerning the discretionary power of federal trial
judges to dismiss what are now called supplemental claims, or the
grounds on which the judge could base such a decision.228 The like
lihood of jury confusion if the supplemental and federal claims were
tried together was “on the list” of appropriate grounds. Most deci
sions, whether to retain or dismiss, were upheld when challenged on
appeal.229
220. 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.3, 400 (2010).
221. Id. at 402, n. 33.
222. See generally 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRAC
TICE–CIVIL § 106.60[2] (2012).
223. Id. In addition to case citations, the only other source in this section is the
House Report. Id.
224. Id. § 106.60[3].
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. § 106.60.
228. See discussion supra Part II.
229. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing problems with ap
peal). In the rare cases where a dismissal was reversed, it was on the ground that the
trial judge had abused her discretion, usually failing to give any reason for the dismissal;
see, e.g., Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1073 (2d Cir. 1989) (giving no reason for refus
ing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion). Until 2009, remand
to state court of supplemental claims that were part of a properly removed case, as
opposed to dismissal, was thought to be not appealable by reason of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d); however, in Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009), the
Court unanimously held that such remand orders are not based upon lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and thus may be reviewed by direct appeal.
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Part III of this Article makes it clear that when Congress codi
fied the grounds for discretionary dismissal of supplemental claims,
the likelihood of jury confusion was not expressly included.230 Also
clear from the history of the legislation was the final change in the
language of the catch-all provision231 from language that would eas
ily provide a source for “jury confusion” to language that is inhospi
table to such a ground.
Part IV of this Article makes it equally clear that since the
adoption of § 1367, both courts and scholars have divided on the
scope of § 1367(c)(4): some viewing the statute as having codified
the pre-1990 case law and others viewing the statute as having sig
nificantly limited the scope of discretion under prior case law.232
Some district courts have focused specifically on the availability of
the risk of jury confusion as an appropriate ground for pretrial dis
missal, and have divided.233 This specific issue has not yet been ad
dressed by the appellate courts or the scholars.234
As noted earlier, § 1367(c) provides the exclusive basis for the
discretionary dismissal of a supplemental claim, and there is no
room in subsections (c)(1), (c)(2), or (c)(3) for jury confusion.235
As such, if jury confusion remains “on the list,” it must be under
(c)(4).
A. Textual Analysis
The interpretation of § 1376(c)(4) as it applies to supplemental
claims that pose a potential for jury confusion “is simple and
straightforward.”236 It proceeds on the assumption that clear, un
ambiguous text must be applied, especially when that text is consis
tent not only with other relevant parts of the text of the statute but
also the broad, unambiguous policies of the statute.237
Section 1367(c)(4) limits discretionary dismissal to supplemen
tal claims that present both (i) circumstances and (ii) compelling
230. See discussion supra Part III.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
232. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
233. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1-2.
234. In Executive Software v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d
1545 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit identified the issue and explicitly left it un
resolved. See supra text at note 192.
235. The closest the statute comes is § 1367(c)(1), which concerns judge confu
sion, not jury confusion.
236. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
237. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Comm’n v. Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n, 589 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala.
1991).
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reasons for declining jurisdiction.238 It may be that a persuasive ar
gument could be made in a particular case that the risk of jury con
fusion presents a “compelling reason for declining jurisdiction.”239
The same cannot be said for the independent requirement that the
circumstance be “exceptional.”
As far back as 1976, then Justice Rehnquist undermined the
argument that the likelihood of jury confusion could ever be excep
tional. In Aldinger v. Howard,240 he was reiterating the point made
by the Ninth Circuit—and flatly rejected by Congress in 1990 when
it adopted § 1367(a)241—that adding a pendent party was a bad
idea. Among the reasons he gave in support was the following,
drawn from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion: “[P]endent state-law claims
arising in a civil rights context will ‘almost inevitably’ involve the
federal court in difficult and unsettled questions of state law, with
the accompanying potential for jury confusion. 513 F.2d at 1261
1262.”242
The continued frequency with which the lower federal courts
continue to rely on jury confusion suggests that not much has
changed in the thirty-five years since Aldinger. The potential for
jury confusion is not exceptional. Yet for the past twenty years,
despite the adoption of § 1367, some federal trial judges continue to
rely on the risk of jury confusion as a ground to dismiss supplemen
tal claims.
Most cases that have used (c)(4) to dismiss supplemental
claims solely on the ground that there is a risk of jury confusion
have ignored the “exceptional circumstances” requirement.243 A
few courts have attempted to address the point, but with hollow
reasoning.244 Thus, in Walker v. City of Detroit,245 a false arrest,
false imprisonment civil rights claim, the trial court dismissed the
supplemental state law claims under (c)(4) sua sponte due to the
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
239. Id. Many cases develop this point. See, e.g., Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867
F.Supp. 1309, 1315-16 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
240. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
241. Specifically, the last sentence of § 1367(a).
242. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 6. Of course, Justice Rehnquist cited no authority for
the fairly remarkable assertion that state law will continue to pose “difficult and unset
tled questions” for federal courts. Id.
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
244. Walker v. City of Detroit, No. 10-13179, 2010 WL 4259835, at *6
(E.D.Mich.2010) (Cleland, J.).
245. Id. at *2-4.
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risk of jury confusion. After explaining in some detail246 why the
risk of confusion was a compelling reason to dismiss, the opinion
deals with the “exceptional circumstances” requirement in a single
paragraph:
The court finds that exceptional circumstances are present in this
case in weighing the likelihood of jury confusion, judicial ineffi
ciency, substantial inconvenience to the parties, and potential un
fairness in outcome which could readily result by attempting to
resolve all claims in a single trial. Though there would be some
duplication of effort required by Plaintiff and the defense in this
case if Plaintiff decides to pursue all of the claims, the court finds
that any advantages to be gained by trying all claims together are
outweighed by the potential for confusion of the issues, legal the
ories, and defenses. Thus, the court will not exercise supplemen
tal jurisdiction and will dismiss without prejudice all state law
claims.247

Clearly, there is nothing in this paragraph that in any way could be
viewed as describing any exceptional circumstance. Rather, it reit
erates the basic reasons for dismissal on this ground that have been
in use since Gibbs.
A conclusion that the risk of jury confusion is not a permissible
basis for a (c)(4) dismissal does not render (c)(4) superfluous.
There have been, and will continue to be, cases that are properly
subject to (c)(4) dismissal. For example, in Voda v. Cortis Corp.,248
a patent infringement action included supplemental claims based on
foreign patent law. The Federal Circuit held that “a district court’s
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction could undermine the obliga
tions of the United States under [international patent] treaties,
which therefore constitute an exceptional circumstance to decline
jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4).”249 And in Sparrow v. Mazda
American Credit,250 a claim that a debt collector engaged in abusive
practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), the court used § 1367(c)(4) to dismiss the supplemental
counterclaims, which sought to recover the underlying debt. Ex
ceptional circumstances were based on protecting the policy of the
FDCPA:
246. The opinion provided such explanation in eleven paragraphs. See id. at *3-7.
247. Walker, 2010 WL 4259835 at *6.
248. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 894 (Fed.Cir. 2007).
249. Id. at 900.
250. Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1069-71 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
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[A]llowing a debt collector to bring an action for the underlying
debt in a case brought under the FDCPA may deter litigants
from pursuing their rights under that statute . . . . This policy
satisfies the exceptional circumstances requirement to support an
order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defen
dant’s state law claims to enforce the debt.251

And in Hays County Guardian v. Supple, the district court re
manded, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the plaintiff’s claims
against state officials in their official capacities.252 With those
claims remanded, the district court decided not to exercise supple
mental jurisdiction over the claims against the defendants in their
individual capacities, for which there was no Eleventh Amendment
bar.253 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding “exceptional circum
stances” and “compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction” over
state-law claims while identical claims, differing only in the capacity
in which the defendants were sued, were proceeding in state
court.254 Such duplicative litigation “would be a pointless waste of
judicial resources.”255
B. Congressional Intent
While the clarity of the textual argument might support the
view that there is no need to go any further, the seemingly ambigu
ous phrases of (c)(4) suggest that an analysis of congressional intent
is appropriate. The source for the argument that congressional in
tent supports the inclusion of jury confusion on “the list” is the first
sentence from the one relevant paragraph in the House Report.256
“Subsection [1367](c) codifies the factors that the Supreme Court
has recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a district
court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim, even
though it is empowered to hear the claim.”257
Before examining this sentence (and the rest of the House Re
port), it will be useful to recall the process that led to the adopted
251. Id. at 1071.
252. Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 124 (5th Cir. 1992).
253. Id. at 125.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. REP.
NO. 101-734 (to accompany H.R. 5381), 6875 (1990); see also supra note 126 and accom
panying text (containing the entire paragraph from the House Report).
257. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. REP.
NO. 101-734 (to accompany H.R. 5381), 6875 (1990).
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text.258 In the case of (c)(4), the catch-all provision, we have an
informative trail to follow, starting with the text. The first version
of subsection (c) had no catch-all provision.259 The next, the WeisFCSC version, had a catch-all with the broadest possible reach, per
mitting discretionary dismissal for any “other appropriate reason[ ]
. . . for declining jurisdiction.”260 The final adopted language elimi
nates the broad language and replaces it with two high hurdles: the
reason for dismissal must be both “exceptional” and
“compelling.”261
The next place to look for Congressional intent, after the text
in question, would be the other parts of the same statute–i.e. the
rest of § 1367. Again, the useful information points in the same
direction. In § 1367(a), Congress significantly expanded the scope
of jurisdictional power over supplemental claims. Both the text of
(a) and the relevant portions of the House Report make this
point.262 It would be unusual if Congress intended that the
§ 1367(a) welcome sign could be undermined by the simple expedi
ent of a judge, acting pursuant to essentially unreviewable discre
tion, stating there would be a risk of jury confusion if the
supplemental claim were not dismissed. The final revision of the
text of (c)(4) is strong evidence that Congress intended to protect
subsection (a) by significantly narrowing the scope of the (c)(4)
catch-all.
No post-1990 opinion that supports a (c)(4) dismissal based on
jury confusion has much to say about the text or congressional in
tent. Rather, as noted above, some rely on a sentence from the one
relevant paragraph of the House Report. The serious flaw in this
paragraph was discussed earlier.263
Why did the House Report contain such an error? One possi
ble explanation suggests itself upon a careful examination of the
legislative path of (c)(4). While the House itself has been criticized
for rushing the passage of this statute,264 the same cannot be said
258. See supra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
259. Hearings, supra note 40, at 28-32 (describing the Wolf-Egnal Proposal).
260. Id. at 98; see also id. at 89-98 (the full proposal submitted by Judge Weis).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006).
262. See, e.g., Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990,
H.R. REP. NO. 101-743 (to accompany H.R. 5381) (1990). “In federal question cases,
[the statute] broadly authorizes the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over additional claims, including claims involving the joinder of additional parties.” Id.
at 6874.
263. See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 172.
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for the drafting process. The bill, which became § 1367, was first
introduced in Congress on July 26, 1990.265 Hearings were held on
September 6, 1990.266 Prior to the Hearings, major changes were
made from the original draft at the suggestion of Judge Weis and
others.267 The Weis draft included as (c)(4) a broadly worded
catch-all provision, which authorized discretionary dismissal for
“other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to the litigants . . . .”268 Clearly, such language could be
fairly said to support the view that prior case law was to be codified.
However, after the Hearing, (c)(4) was substantially rewritten. In
stead of an unlimited list of reasons that only had to satisfy the test
of being “appropriate,” (c)(4) now requires that the reason for dis
missal be both “exceptional” and “compelling.”269 The House Re
port was filed on September 18, 1990, and clearly reflects the
adopted version of (c)(4).270
The first sentence of the paragraph would have made sense if it
had been drafted with the Weis version of (c) in mind. But in light
of the final version of (c)(4), which was clearly in mind when the
second and third sentences of the paragraph were drafted, it is hard
to understand how the first sentence was drafted at the same time.
It could well be that the second and third sentences were inserted
without realizing how they clashed with the first sentence.271
In any event, the text of (c)(4) and the broad policies reflected
by § 1367(a) leave no doubt that the text means what it says and
that jury confusion is not “on the list.” So how is it that so many
judges got it wrong? Not surprisingly, many judges would like to
maximize the scope of their discretionary power. Moreover, if a
judge wants to dismiss a supplemental claim, supporting the asser
tion that there is a risk of jury confusion will be fairly simple.

265. See generally Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990,
H.R. REP. NO. 101-743 (to accompany H.R. 5381) (1990).
266. Id.
267. See Wolf, supra note 14, at 15-20.
268. Hearings, supra note 40, and accompanying text (describing the full proposal
submitted by Judge Weis, Hearings, supra note 40, at 98, following his prepared state
ment to the committee).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006).
270. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implemenation Act of 1990, H.R. REP
NO. 101-734 (to accompany H.R. 5381) (1990).
271. The simple fix is to read the word “some” into the first sentence, so it would
accurately reflect that Congress codified some, but not all, prior case law.
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CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that the elimination of the risk of jury
confusion as a ground for dismissal of supplemental claims is sup
ported by the text, the broad policies of the supplemental jurisdic
tion statute, and the very specific path that led to the text of
§ 1367(c). Moreover, this conclusion finds further support in the
broad procedural policies.
If we focus on the impact of discretionary dismissals of supple
mental claims, the most important point is the ground for the dis
missal. If it occurred following a dismissal (on the merits) of the
federal claims or due to the substantial predominance of the pen
dent claim, it could be fairly said that the lawsuit belonged in state
court.272 Following dismissal of these cases, any further litigation
would be in state court and there would be no harm to any signifi
cant interest. If the ground for dismissal was the novelty or com
plexity of the state law issue, there would be significant competing
interests.273 It would be difficult to defend either outcome categori
cally.274 In situations where the sole ground for the dismissal of the
supplemental claim was the risk or likelihood of jury confusion,
there would be a clear frustration both of the plaintiffs’ interests in
obtaining full vindication of their rights in a single proceeding as
well as the broad procedural interest in overall efficiency. The sup
posed upside of such a dismissal is to avoid a hypothetical federal
institutional interest in avoiding a confused jury (if the case is ever
tried).275
The institutional interests that were served or disserved by
such a dismissal depended on the choice made by the plaintiff. If
the plaintiff separately pursued both the state and federal claims,
overall institutional interests in efficiency were disserved, even if
the federal trial jury heard a simpler case.276 And if the dismissal
272. These two grounds are codified as § 1367(c)(2) and (c)(3).
273. Codified as § 1367(c)(1); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that overall efficiency would be served by retention of the
claim, while dismissal would lead to “a surer-footed reading of applicable [state] law”).
274. But I’ll try; a better result is to keep lawsuit together and use certification to
the highest state court to resolve the state law issue. The Wolf-Egnal proposal con
tained such a provision. See subsection (f), Hearings, supra note 40, at 31; see also
Wolf, supra note 14, at 30-31.
275. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing difficult choices
facing a plaintiff). On the likelihood of trial, a 2004 federal study found that 97 percent
of civil cases are settled or dismissed without a trial. Supra note 43.
276. See supra note 275 (discussing how rarely civil lawsuits are actually tried);
see also supra note 48.
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led to the plaintiffs’ abandoning the state claims (and litigating only
in federal court) or abandoning the federal claims (and litigating
only in state court), the federal institutional advantage of avoiding a
complicated jury trial (if the case was actually tried) could hardly
overcome this loss to the plaintiff. Certainly, such a result was con
trary to the spirit of § 1367, of Gibbs, and of modern procedure
generally.277
A final reason for concluding that the likelihood of jury confu
sion should be categorically eliminated as a ground for discretion
ary dismissal is the ease with which a trial judge can invoke it to
justify dismissal, whether or not that is the true reason, as well as
the difficulty of appellate supervision of such dismissals. Moreover,
there are well known techniques for reducing or eliminating jury
confusion (if the claims are tried together).278 And there is always
the possibility of separate federal trials. In its discussion of the risk
of jury confusion as a possible ground for discretionary dismissal,
the Gibbs Court noted that this factor was “independent of jurisdic
tional considerations” and that in such a situation, “jurisdiction
should ordinarily be refused.”279

277. Recall that Gibbs upheld a trial judge’s holding that retained, rather than
dismissed, a pendent claim, and commended the judge for “employing a special verdict
form” so that “the possibility of confusion could be lessened.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729.
And recall that at the start of Gibbs’ discussion of discretion is the point that pendent
jurisdiction is justified by “considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants.” Id. at 726. The court further discussed that dismissal would be appropri
ate where these factors were not present. Id. There is no suggestion in Gibbs that
pendent claims should be dismissed because the trial judge has to work a little harder to
make the case less confusing for the jury. See generally id.
278. Id. at 726-27.
279. Id. at 727 (emphasis added).

